Actions and Consequences

What has the war in Georgia taught us? Well, first off, when Russian troops are deployed as peacekeepers in your breakaway provinces, it’s a good idea to not antagonize them. The Georgian government was under the mistaken impression that the US’s support for its NATO candidacy implied far more military aid than has been forthcoming – or perhaps they simply felt like Russia’s response wouldn’t be quite so severe.

As for Russia, it seems increasingly clear that their motivation is not simply to increase their influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but to cripple the Georgian military. Putin and Medvedev have both said that the war is drawing to its “logical conclusion” – that conclusion apparently being to pursue the Georgian military until it’s broken, and until they’ve cut the country in half at Gori.

The NY Times reports:

“Russia says it is acting to protect residents there and to punish Georgia for the assault, which Georgia says was to protect Georgian enclaves in the territory from attack and to push out illegally deployed Russian troops.”

Well, fair enough. Georgia overplayed their hand, and are now caught between Russia and the unwillingness and the inability (whatever William Kristol may have to say) of the West to do something substantive about the situation. There’s only so much the United States and the European Union can do to counter Russia in a situation like this. The benefit of defending the Georgian military is simply not worth the cost of a large scale war with Russia. That may suck for Georgia at the moment, but maybe they should keep it in mind the next time they decide to go waking up bears.

And what with the consequences be for Russia? I can’t see them allowing South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be folded back into Georgia – especially since the provinces themselves clearly don’t want that. Two new states, closely allied with Russia? Or will Russia try to make the relationship a bit more permanent?