Getting away from the war for just a bit, there’s a very cool interactive graphic in the NY Times today. It has images of Edward Hopper’s paintings of Cape Cod, along with photographs of the subjects now. There are audio statements from people who are related somehow to the subjects. It’s a very nifty little doohickey, and if you like the art of Edward Hopper, it’s well worth five or ten minutes to check it out. It’s impressive how little the area has changed since the first half of the 20th Century when Hopper was painting.
This is the kind of stuff I’m glad to see coming out finally. It’s interesting to look at the past’s view of the future, seeing what happened, what didn’t and why (touch screens are inconvenient, but drive-through toll booths are here to stay). It’s taken a while for major news organizations to utilize the internet in more interesting ways, beyond simply putting out their old content, but they are finally wrapping their heads around it.
Monday, August 11, 2008
If You Won't Listen To Me...
Then listen to Josh Marshall over at TPM, as he's saying a lot of the same things. Money quote:
The hawks will say that the example set in Georgia will foreshadow Eastern Europe. But that's a highly, highly questionable leap. We're in the midst of being led very far astray.Amen to that.
A Little Perspective
I just wanted to give a shout out to the stupidest op-ed I've ever seen by Robert Kagan, at least since the last op-ed I read by Robert Kagan. It's hard for me to explain how amazingly unhelpful I find this kind of analysis. The opening paragraph really says it all:
It is exactly this kind of grandiose, anti-realist, analysis that has made our foreign policy decisions so unproductive during the Bush years. Let's everyone say this together now: Seeing the world through this neo-con lens does not work.
If you taped Putin's eyes open and forced him to read this, do you figure he'd be thinking, "damn it all, Robert Kagan is on to me" before smiling menacingly, or do you think he'd just laugh his ass off?
The details of who did what to precipitate Russia's war against Georgia are not very important. Do you recall the precise details of the Sudeten Crisis that led to Nazi Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia? Of course not, because that morally ambiguous dispute is rightly remembered as a minor part of a much bigger dramaReally? The Nazi's huh?
It is exactly this kind of grandiose, anti-realist, analysis that has made our foreign policy decisions so unproductive during the Bush years. Let's everyone say this together now: Seeing the world through this neo-con lens does not work.
If you taped Putin's eyes open and forced him to read this, do you figure he'd be thinking, "damn it all, Robert Kagan is on to me" before smiling menacingly, or do you think he'd just laugh his ass off?
Where Do We Go From Here?
After re-catching up on the latest reports out of Georgia, I'd like to discuss the conflict from a more macro perspective.
I think the claim Aaron made in an earlier post that Georgia probably miscalculated the degree of support they could expect from NATO countries, the United States in particular, might not be as true as it would seem at first glance. I think it's more likely Saakashvili felt that he had no options. As the NYT article we linked to yesterday discussed, Saakasshivili was in an impossible situation. He had been rejected by NATO, for the nearly explicit reason that they didn't want to have their hand forced in situations exactly like the one that has transpired. It also seems as though he felt that his presidency wouldn't endure a voluntary annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (we'll put aside for the moment whether the maintenance of his presidency should have been much of a consideration).
More importantly, and this is the bottom line in my opinion -- Russia wanted these provinces and knew that they could acquire them at a cost that seemed reasonable. Putin is the consummate realist and I'm imagining his thought process went something like this:
---------
Having these territories (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) is better than not having them. They're Russian citizens and we militarily control the provinces anyway.
We have no desire to ever have NATO countries on our borders, especially ones that are openly antagonistic to our government. This action should make NATO strongly disinclined to seriously consider subsequent countries for membership that have any potential at all to be involved in similar conflicts in the future (and we'll make sure that list of countries is never zero). Furthermore, who's going to retaliate against our hostilities? Western Europe? Please. The United States is in no position to expend troops and money that it doesn't have, and the public has no appetite at all to expend them in a former Soviet state that 99% of the population couldn't find on a map. It will probably cause some spirited saber rattling from the McCain camp (and maybe even from Obama), and might even present a headache of sorts if McCain were to win, but he's probably losing, and even if he does win the odds of him really doing anything other than giving a fiery speech about freedom and democracy is so remote as to be acceptable.
While we're at it we can kick the piss out of Georgia, which won't be a bad precedent for any other former satellite that starts acting up.
----------------
That's it. Russia wanted these provinces and now they have them, at very little cost. There won't be any real push back. No sanctions. No bombings. Certainly no foreign ground troops either in Georgia or Russia. Just some condemning rhetoric, and most of the world's paying more attention to the Olympics anyway.
I expect Russia will soon pull its troops out of Georgia, keeping South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and that will be that for now.
I think the claim Aaron made in an earlier post that Georgia probably miscalculated the degree of support they could expect from NATO countries, the United States in particular, might not be as true as it would seem at first glance. I think it's more likely Saakashvili felt that he had no options. As the NYT article we linked to yesterday discussed, Saakasshivili was in an impossible situation. He had been rejected by NATO, for the nearly explicit reason that they didn't want to have their hand forced in situations exactly like the one that has transpired. It also seems as though he felt that his presidency wouldn't endure a voluntary annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (we'll put aside for the moment whether the maintenance of his presidency should have been much of a consideration).
More importantly, and this is the bottom line in my opinion -- Russia wanted these provinces and knew that they could acquire them at a cost that seemed reasonable. Putin is the consummate realist and I'm imagining his thought process went something like this:
---------
Having these territories (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) is better than not having them. They're Russian citizens and we militarily control the provinces anyway.
We have no desire to ever have NATO countries on our borders, especially ones that are openly antagonistic to our government. This action should make NATO strongly disinclined to seriously consider subsequent countries for membership that have any potential at all to be involved in similar conflicts in the future (and we'll make sure that list of countries is never zero). Furthermore, who's going to retaliate against our hostilities? Western Europe? Please. The United States is in no position to expend troops and money that it doesn't have, and the public has no appetite at all to expend them in a former Soviet state that 99% of the population couldn't find on a map. It will probably cause some spirited saber rattling from the McCain camp (and maybe even from Obama), and might even present a headache of sorts if McCain were to win, but he's probably losing, and even if he does win the odds of him really doing anything other than giving a fiery speech about freedom and democracy is so remote as to be acceptable.
While we're at it we can kick the piss out of Georgia, which won't be a bad precedent for any other former satellite that starts acting up.
----------------
That's it. Russia wanted these provinces and now they have them, at very little cost. There won't be any real push back. No sanctions. No bombings. Certainly no foreign ground troops either in Georgia or Russia. Just some condemning rhetoric, and most of the world's paying more attention to the Olympics anyway.
I expect Russia will soon pull its troops out of Georgia, keeping South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and that will be that for now.
Actions and Consequences
What has the war in Georgia taught us? Well, first off, when Russian troops are deployed as peacekeepers in your breakaway provinces, it’s a good idea to not antagonize them. The Georgian government was under the mistaken impression that the US’s support for its NATO candidacy implied far more military aid than has been forthcoming – or perhaps they simply felt like Russia’s response wouldn’t be quite so severe.
As for Russia, it seems increasingly clear that their motivation is not simply to increase their influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but to cripple the Georgian military. Putin and Medvedev have both said that the war is drawing to its “logical conclusion” – that conclusion apparently being to pursue the Georgian military until it’s broken, and until they’ve cut the country in half at Gori.
The NY Times reports:
And what with the consequences be for Russia? I can’t see them allowing South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be folded back into Georgia – especially since the provinces themselves clearly don’t want that. Two new states, closely allied with Russia? Or will Russia try to make the relationship a bit more permanent?
As for Russia, it seems increasingly clear that their motivation is not simply to increase their influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but to cripple the Georgian military. Putin and Medvedev have both said that the war is drawing to its “logical conclusion” – that conclusion apparently being to pursue the Georgian military until it’s broken, and until they’ve cut the country in half at Gori.
The NY Times reports:
“Russia says it is acting to protect residents there and to punish Georgia for the assault, which Georgia says was to protect Georgian enclaves in the territory from attack and to push out illegally deployed Russian troops.”Well, fair enough. Georgia overplayed their hand, and are now caught between Russia and the unwillingness and the inability (whatever William Kristol may have to say) of the West to do something substantive about the situation. There’s only so much the United States and the European Union can do to counter Russia in a situation like this. The benefit of defending the Georgian military is simply not worth the cost of a large scale war with Russia. That may suck for Georgia at the moment, but maybe they should keep it in mind the next time they decide to go waking up bears.
And what with the consequences be for Russia? I can’t see them allowing South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be folded back into Georgia – especially since the provinces themselves clearly don’t want that. Two new states, closely allied with Russia? Or will Russia try to make the relationship a bit more permanent?
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Geese, Ganders
One of my favorite bloggers, Matt Yglesias, is back from vacation and is now blogging over at Think Progress, and had a great post discussing the war in Georgia. Yglesias ponders what, exactly, it is that we get out of helping Georgia keep two breakaway provinces:
DP was discussing earlier why provinces wish to breakaway from countries. The conclusion I've come too is, if Kosovo should be allowed to determine its own fate, I can't see a reason why the Georgian provinces should be controlled by a government that, well, already doesn't control them. The fact that it is wrapped up in a larger set of political circumstances doesn't have much to do with that.
Update: And then, of course, Russia seems to invade the rest of Georgia:
Indeed, strong pro-Georgian views in the U.S. media and foreign policy community correlate heavily with strong pro-Kosovo views. This highlights the fact that the underlying issue here is simply a disposition to take a dim view of Moscow and to favor aggressive policies to roll back Russian influence rather than some kind of deep and sincerely felt desire to help Georgia.I think this pretty much sums up the US’s stance on Georgia. We are supporting them because it annoys the Russians, not because we have some sort of deep strategic need to preserve Georgia as it exists. This is not to say, of course, that the Russians ought to be free to take away provinces from Georgia (that don’t, in fact, seem to want to be, or are in any meaningful way, a part of Georgia). But it does mean to say: what are we going to do about it? The answer seems to be: not a whole lot.
DP was discussing earlier why provinces wish to breakaway from countries. The conclusion I've come too is, if Kosovo should be allowed to determine its own fate, I can't see a reason why the Georgian provinces should be controlled by a government that, well, already doesn't control them. The fact that it is wrapped up in a larger set of political circumstances doesn't have much to do with that.
Update: And then, of course, Russia seems to invade the rest of Georgia:
The advance appeared to answer the question on which the conflict had been pivoting: Would Russia simply occupy the two separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or would it push into Georgia, raising the possibility of a full-scale invasion?The situation is, as they say, fluid. Russia taking over two provinces that already don't want to be part of Georgia is one thing. Russia just taking over Georgia is a different matter entirely.
Knee Bone's Connected to the Renegade Province
The recent (and apparently expanding) conflict between Georgia and Russia has caused me to take a step back and consider the nature of relationships with separatist portions of various countries.
My primary question is, why do countries almost always fight to keep their country intact, when the related costs of annexation seem so high, and when splintering seems to happen quite frequently anyway? Now clearly, allowing a separatist state to become independent isn't always (or probably even often) the answer. However, in some instances, I wonder what the incentive is for union.
Looking at South Ossetia and Abkhazia (the Georgian provinces currently the focal point of the Georgia/Russia conflict), they were nearly autonomous areas over which the Georgian government exerted almost no control. Tibet, Kurdistan, and East Timor (now its own sovereign country) might be somewhat analogous examples. All are also areas that I don't believe have large amounts of diversity in terms of separatist beliefs (almost everyone wants out).
I can only think of two good reasons for disallowing secession. One, they are of some strategic importance. Perhaps they provide a disproportionately high tax base (unlikely in these cases), lie over valuable natural resources (true for Kurdistan), provide your only access to coastal ports, etc. Reasons like this are difficult to quantify, but make sense to me on some levels.
Two, it's bad precedent. If you let one renegade region opt-out, so to speak, then what will you do the next time a group of ten farmers holed up in some corner of your country sign a petition requesting independence? This "slippery slope" argument makes much less sense to me. Or, more pointedly, if you're really concerned that allowing one region to secede will beget other regions requesting the same thing, you probably have nothing approaching a stable government.
To ask the question more pointedly, what pragmatic advantage is China getting out of ruling Tibet? Wouldn't they be better off geo-politically to hand them the metaphorical keys to the car, establish trade relations and an embassy (or not) and wish them luck? Correspondingly, what was Georgia getting out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- contentious areas over which they ostensibly had no real control? If they were afraid that such an overt concession to Russia amounted to appeasement, I would counter that keeping these provinces under the Georgian flag didn't exactly do much to advance Georgian autonomy.
Hindsight is 20/20 of course, but I just wonder about the nearly universal propensity for countries to do everything possible to keep every existing acre of their current sphere, even when the maintenance of that space could potentially destabilize the parts of the country that are happy to be in the fold.
My primary question is, why do countries almost always fight to keep their country intact, when the related costs of annexation seem so high, and when splintering seems to happen quite frequently anyway? Now clearly, allowing a separatist state to become independent isn't always (or probably even often) the answer. However, in some instances, I wonder what the incentive is for union.
Looking at South Ossetia and Abkhazia (the Georgian provinces currently the focal point of the Georgia/Russia conflict), they were nearly autonomous areas over which the Georgian government exerted almost no control. Tibet, Kurdistan, and East Timor (now its own sovereign country) might be somewhat analogous examples. All are also areas that I don't believe have large amounts of diversity in terms of separatist beliefs (almost everyone wants out).
I can only think of two good reasons for disallowing secession. One, they are of some strategic importance. Perhaps they provide a disproportionately high tax base (unlikely in these cases), lie over valuable natural resources (true for Kurdistan), provide your only access to coastal ports, etc. Reasons like this are difficult to quantify, but make sense to me on some levels.
Two, it's bad precedent. If you let one renegade region opt-out, so to speak, then what will you do the next time a group of ten farmers holed up in some corner of your country sign a petition requesting independence? This "slippery slope" argument makes much less sense to me. Or, more pointedly, if you're really concerned that allowing one region to secede will beget other regions requesting the same thing, you probably have nothing approaching a stable government.
To ask the question more pointedly, what pragmatic advantage is China getting out of ruling Tibet? Wouldn't they be better off geo-politically to hand them the metaphorical keys to the car, establish trade relations and an embassy (or not) and wish them luck? Correspondingly, what was Georgia getting out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- contentious areas over which they ostensibly had no real control? If they were afraid that such an overt concession to Russia amounted to appeasement, I would counter that keeping these provinces under the Georgian flag didn't exactly do much to advance Georgian autonomy.
Hindsight is 20/20 of course, but I just wonder about the nearly universal propensity for countries to do everything possible to keep every existing acre of their current sphere, even when the maintenance of that space could potentially destabilize the parts of the country that are happy to be in the fold.
Extinct Blog of the Day
Today's departed blog belonged to soldier Andrew Olmsted, whose blog ended when he was killed in Iraq on January 3rd of this year. His last post (pre-written, to be posted in the event of his death) was published by hilzoy over at ObsidianWings. I read his blog before his death and remember crying when I read his last post more than 8 months ago. I didn't know then that I'd ever have a blog, much less a feature whose confines allowed me to rediscover his writing. I learned more from reading his blog than from every embedded reporter I ever saw on NBC combined. Money quote(s):
What I don't want this to be is a chance for me, or anyone else, to be maudlin. I'm dead. That sucks, at least for me and my family and friends. But all the tears in the world aren't going to bring me back, so I would prefer that people remember the good things about me rather than mourning my loss. (If it turns out a specific number of tears will, in fact, bring me back to life, then by all means, break out the onions.) I had a pretty good life, as I noted above. Sure, all things being equal I would have preferred to have more time, but I have no business complaining with all the good fortune I've enjoyed in my life. So if you're up for that, put on a little 80s music (preferably vintage 1980-1984), grab a Coke and have a drink with me. If you have it, throw 'Freedom Isn't Free' from the Team America soundtrack in; if you can't laugh at that song, I think you need to lighten up a little. I'm dead, but if you're reading this, you're not, so take a moment to enjoy that happy fact...Fair enough. As he wished, I won't espouse my personal views about the Iraq War in this space, under his last words asking me to refrain from doing just that. But, I hope that he will excuse me if I do take this opportunity to remind people that through the Olympics, through McCain's attack ads, through Obama's vacation choice, through Paris Hilton's jail time and John Edwards' paternity issues, the Iraq War continues. Andrew's fate, while particularly public, was not particularly special, having been shared by 4,137 other American soldiers as of today. I think we owe it to them, not necessarily to call for troop withdrawal, or further commitment and involvement -- but to at least care. To think about the way forward. To realize that, in a democracy, our government's involvement is your involvement, and my involvement, and to think about what our roles are (however small) within that framework. To refuse to be bystanders.
I do ask (not that I'm in a position to enforce this) that no one try to use my death to further their political purposes. I went to Iraq and did what I did for my reasons, not yours. My life isn't a chit to be used to bludgeon people to silence on either side.
A Georgia/Russia Primer
If you're interested in what's going on in the Georgia/Russian conflict that's sprung up this week, there's an excellent piece by James Traub in the New York Times that really explains a lot. It's not short (probably taking about 20-25 minutes to read), but tripled my understanding of the political situation that led to this week's hostilities.
If you really want to understand the conflict, I highly suggest pieces like this, because if you're waiting around for CNN to spend half as much time on this war as they do on the personal life of John Edwards, it's going to be a disillusioning experience.
If you really want to understand the conflict, I highly suggest pieces like this, because if you're waiting around for CNN to spend half as much time on this war as they do on the personal life of John Edwards, it's going to be a disillusioning experience.
Inside the Clinton Campaign
Politico seems to have broken the embargo on the Atlantic’s big Clinton story for next week. It’s an interesting read, and seems to confirm the rumors that were floating around at the time about how disorganized and divided the Clinton campaign machine was. It also seems to confirm that they gave no real thought about what to do if Clinton didn’t walk away with the nomination out of Iowa, and that by the time they realized the size of their mistake, it was too late to regain their footing.
One thing that does surprise me though, is the extent to which the worst impressions of the Clinton campaign that I had during the primary are confirmed: the sense of entitlement, the internal instability and the half-hearted, incoherent response to the Obama campaign. According to the article, Mark Penn continually advocated the kind of “other” attacks on Obama that he was said to favor at the time. One of the impressions I get reading it is that Clinton and her advisers were torn – they couldn’t decide if they wanted to run with the kind of nasty, base attacks that would drive Obama’s favorability down and allow Clinton to sneak into a victory after they had almost completely wrecked their chances.
Of course, they didn’t do that – at least not to the extent that they could have done. In a lot of ways, the whole thing is amazing for watching how the Clinton campaign went from being the inevitable nominee to losing it almost exclusively through unforced errors. Obama ran a magnificent campaign. He and his advisers seemed to get everything right, to meet every crisis with a well thought out response. Clinton, it seemed, bumbled from one mistake to the next, and even when they saw one possible way to still win – attacking Obama as un-American – screwed it up by not committing.
At the start of the campaign, I felt like Clinton would make for an excellent president, although she certainly wasn’t my first choice. But as the campaign went along, like a lot of Obama supporters, I began to like her and how she was conducting her presidential bid less and less. This article confirms my impressions of her and her campaign, but it also improves my view of her. She saw one path to victory, by going wholly negative against Obama in more conservative states, but didn’t follow through with it (I still think the “3AM” ad and their response to Wright was pretty sleazy). There has to be something positive said about someone who sees the worst possible path, and even if they take a few hesitant steps down it, are still unable to walk down it boldly. Clinton’s performances on Obama’s behalf have been great so far, and I can see no effort on her part to undermine Obama to set herself up for 2012. While I think that Clinton’s campaign deserved to lose, if for no other reason than their clear internal incompetence, I’m pleased with the impression I’ve gotten of her since then.
One thing that does surprise me though, is the extent to which the worst impressions of the Clinton campaign that I had during the primary are confirmed: the sense of entitlement, the internal instability and the half-hearted, incoherent response to the Obama campaign. According to the article, Mark Penn continually advocated the kind of “other” attacks on Obama that he was said to favor at the time. One of the impressions I get reading it is that Clinton and her advisers were torn – they couldn’t decide if they wanted to run with the kind of nasty, base attacks that would drive Obama’s favorability down and allow Clinton to sneak into a victory after they had almost completely wrecked their chances.
Of course, they didn’t do that – at least not to the extent that they could have done. In a lot of ways, the whole thing is amazing for watching how the Clinton campaign went from being the inevitable nominee to losing it almost exclusively through unforced errors. Obama ran a magnificent campaign. He and his advisers seemed to get everything right, to meet every crisis with a well thought out response. Clinton, it seemed, bumbled from one mistake to the next, and even when they saw one possible way to still win – attacking Obama as un-American – screwed it up by not committing.
At the start of the campaign, I felt like Clinton would make for an excellent president, although she certainly wasn’t my first choice. But as the campaign went along, like a lot of Obama supporters, I began to like her and how she was conducting her presidential bid less and less. This article confirms my impressions of her and her campaign, but it also improves my view of her. She saw one path to victory, by going wholly negative against Obama in more conservative states, but didn’t follow through with it (I still think the “3AM” ad and their response to Wright was pretty sleazy). There has to be something positive said about someone who sees the worst possible path, and even if they take a few hesitant steps down it, are still unable to walk down it boldly. Clinton’s performances on Obama’s behalf have been great so far, and I can see no effort on her part to undermine Obama to set herself up for 2012. While I think that Clinton’s campaign deserved to lose, if for no other reason than their clear internal incompetence, I’m pleased with the impression I’ve gotten of her since then.
Saturday, August 9, 2008
TPBP Week in Review
Ah, it's been another satisfying week here at The Pseudo Body Politic. We set new records in site traffic, and total posts. We also added blogger Aaron, who has already been a great addition to TPBP, and managed to add to the cultural lexicon by creating the word "terroristin’" in a post earlier today. You can't put a price on new verbs folks.
Also, my friend Dome still hasn't paid me his outstanding $1 debt (as he predicted that TPBP would last less than a week). Obviously, the continued existence of TPBP is a bitter affront to his pessimistic worldview. Ah, well, onto the TPBP reader awards...
Comment of the week goes to reader "pw" whose contributions on the Chinese Democracy post made even me feel almost knowledgeable about the level of internal dissent within China (clearly, no small feat). The post itself may have been so-so, but it's really worth going back and reading the comments, if only to see pw's really insightful thoughts.
Reader of the week goes to..."pw", with a dishonorable mention going to "nicholas" who's comments were so offensive as to merit deletion roughly half the time. It may have been a high traffic week here at TPBP, but it wasn't the best in terms of reader participation. So, step it up, and challenge "pw's" current stranglehold on the weekly awards.
Joking aside, thanks to all of you that stopped by to make TPBP part of your lives this past week. If you think this blog is worthwhile, please let others know about it, as having a sizable readership makes it far more likely that we'll be able to continue providing (nearly) quality posts on a daily basis. I hope you can check back again.
Also, my friend Dome still hasn't paid me his outstanding $1 debt (as he predicted that TPBP would last less than a week). Obviously, the continued existence of TPBP is a bitter affront to his pessimistic worldview. Ah, well, onto the TPBP reader awards...
Comment of the week goes to reader "pw" whose contributions on the Chinese Democracy post made even me feel almost knowledgeable about the level of internal dissent within China (clearly, no small feat). The post itself may have been so-so, but it's really worth going back and reading the comments, if only to see pw's really insightful thoughts.
Reader of the week goes to..."pw", with a dishonorable mention going to "nicholas" who's comments were so offensive as to merit deletion roughly half the time. It may have been a high traffic week here at TPBP, but it wasn't the best in terms of reader participation. So, step it up, and challenge "pw's" current stranglehold on the weekly awards.
Joking aside, thanks to all of you that stopped by to make TPBP part of your lives this past week. If you think this blog is worthwhile, please let others know about it, as having a sizable readership makes it far more likely that we'll be able to continue providing (nearly) quality posts on a daily basis. I hope you can check back again.
Big Trouble in Little Former Soviet Union
So, Russian invaded Georgia the other day. I've been trying to pull myself away from the women's 10 meter air rifle competition long enough to find out exactly what in the hell's going on.
So, Georgie tries to reassert control over a province that doesn't want to be part of Georgia (and where many of those living in the province are Russian citizens). The Russians then invade Georgia, sending in ground troops, and conducting air strikes on multiple targets. Both sides are calling it a war. Everyone wants there to not be a war and is calling for a cease fire. The EU says they'll help everyone sort things out.
Now I understand why Russian would invade a sovereign nation and everything, but...oh, wait. I guess I don't understand. In everything I've read about what's going on, it doesn't seem like Russian's really offered up much on the order of an explanation. I understand that they have citizens in Georgia, but invasion? Not to cherry-pick examples, and I'm not calling this analogous, but there are a lot of Mexicans in California, but I'm not sure Mexico has a right to invade SoCal under any circumstances short of ethnic cleansing.
I'll keep an eye out in the coming days, but I think we should all stay tuned in the meantime. Even if it means skipping parts of the synchronized diving competition.
So, Georgie tries to reassert control over a province that doesn't want to be part of Georgia (and where many of those living in the province are Russian citizens). The Russians then invade Georgia, sending in ground troops, and conducting air strikes on multiple targets. Both sides are calling it a war. Everyone wants there to not be a war and is calling for a cease fire. The EU says they'll help everyone sort things out.
Now I understand why Russian would invade a sovereign nation and everything, but...oh, wait. I guess I don't understand. In everything I've read about what's going on, it doesn't seem like Russian's really offered up much on the order of an explanation. I understand that they have citizens in Georgia, but invasion? Not to cherry-pick examples, and I'm not calling this analogous, but there are a lot of Mexicans in California, but I'm not sure Mexico has a right to invade SoCal under any circumstances short of ethnic cleansing.
I'll keep an eye out in the coming days, but I think we should all stay tuned in the meantime. Even if it means skipping parts of the synchronized diving competition.
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